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DEPARTMENT AND AF A/S FRAZER AND IO A/S SILVERBERG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2016
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [PREL](#) [KPKO](#) [SU](#) [AU](#) [UN](#)
SUBJECT: DARFUR: CHARGE AND MFA MINISTER OF STATE DISCUSS
AMIS/UN REHATTING

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CAMERON HUME; REASON: 1.4(B) AND (D)

¶1. (C) On August 10 CDA Hume, at his request, met with MFA Minister of State Wasiila Samani to discuss UN rehatting of AU peacekeepers in Darfur and the state of bilateral relations. Hume noted that the morning newspapers reported an interview in which Samani expressed hope for an improvement in U.S./Sudanese relations in the near future. Hume expressed appreciation for that hope, but he said it was important for Samani to be aware that, unless the Government of Sudan agreed to an early transition to UN forces in Darfur, the bilateral relationship would go into a nosedive. Hume provided Samani with an advance copy of the statement on situation in Darfur to be released by the Department spokesman.

¶2. (C) Samani shifted the subject of discussion from what could happen in the next two weeks to complain that the U.S. and other Security Council members had not fully consulted Sudan before adoption of a resolution on Darfur last May. Hume disputed whether the extent of consultation before an earlier decision was a meaningful issue. The challenge was how to confront squarely and honestly the problem of the deteriorating situation in Darfur, to arrange for early transition to a UN force, and to put the implementation of the peace process back on track. Hume had given the Sudanese side the current negotiating text over a week ago, but he still had no comment from the Sudanese side. Presumably the Sudanese were going to stick with President Bashir's flat refusal to discuss the issue, and further attempts to discuss it would be a waste of time.

¶3. (C) Samani protested that a group of high level officials were indeed working to produce a detailed position on the current draft. Hume welcomed that information but reminded Samani that negotiations were nevertheless going forward, first among the P-5 and then with all Council members. Whatever the problems of entering negotiations due to the adamant opposition of President Bashir to a UN force, it would soon become more difficult to respond to Sudanese concerns. The bottom line would have to remain an agreement on a UN force to take over from AMIS. If such an agreement could not be reached quickly, it would be impossible to take any steps to improve bilateral relations in the near term.

¶4. (C) Samani asserted that the government would present its position no later than Sunday. Hume responded that he would welcome receiving such a position, but it would be important for the Sudanese to engage in New York with delegations to the Security Council. While Hume wanted to encourage the Sudanese to develop a position on the text, any actual

negotiations should take place in New York.

15. (C) Comment: Given the position of President Bashir, Sudanese officialdom is in some agony to come up with a negotiating position. Most Sudanese want better bilateral relations, but the UN plan for Darfur peacekeeping still has to be sold on its own merits. Unlike Bashir, a number of key officials doubt the wisdom of a unilateral process to bring peace to Darfur, and they want to engage. Now they have to get the permission or courage to do so. End comment.
HUME